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ABSTRACT 
Biometrics refers to a way of authentication in the world of computer security using various metrics linked to human 
characteristics. It is used for access control and recognition of individuals. This paper provides the working of 
Biometrics System, description of its various features and various biometrics methods used in digital world of 
computer. 
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     INTRODUCTION 
We forget passwords. We lose access cards. Yet despite jokes about leaving our heads at home, we always take our 
bodies with us. This allows biometric authentication, which is based on biological (bio) measurements (metrics). 
Biometric authentication [1] is based on something you are (your fingerprint, iris pattern, face, hand geometry, etc.) 
or something you do (write, type, walk, etc.). 
 
BIOMETRIC SYSTEMS 
INITIAL ENROLLMENT 
Figure 1 [1] shows a biometric authentication system. Each user must first be enrolled in the system. Enrollment has 
three steps: 
 Step 1 The reader scans each person’s biometric data. This enrollment scan creates far too much data to use. 
In addition, the scan data will be different each time the user is scanned. 
 Step 2 The reader then processes the enrollment scan data to extract a few key features from the mass of 
scanned data. These few key features, not the entire set of scanned data, will be used to identify or verify the 
user in the future. 
 Step 3 The reader finally sends the key feature data to the database, which stores the key feature data as the 
user’s template. 
 
Why not use entire scans instead of key features? The problem is that entire scans are not very useful in raw form. If 
a person swipes his or her finger at different angles, raw scan files will be very different, but key features such as the 
relative locations of loops, arches, and whorls in fingerprints will be the same or almost the same no matter how a 
finger is scanned. 
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Fig. 1 Biometric Authentication System 
 
 
Fig. 2: The enrollment process for a fingerprint reader 
 
Figure 2 shows the enrollment process for a fingerprint reader on a Transcend JetFlash. The process is user-friendly 
and takes about three minutes. To complete the process, a user is required to swipe the same finger four times and 
enter a password. 
 
SUBSEQUENT ACCESS ATTEMPTS 
When users later wish to be authenticated, they are scanned again. The reader processes this supplicant scanning 
information to create key features. These key features become the user access data. The central system matches the 
user access data against the person’s template in the database. 
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Fig. 3: Subsequent Access Attempt 
 
ACCEPTANCE OR REJECTION 
When a system receives access data, it computes a match index, which is the difference between the scan’s key features 
and the template. There is never a perfect match, because scanning never works exactly the same way twice. If the 
error is smaller than a value called the decision criterion, the supplicant is accepted as a match. If not, the supplicant 
is rejected as a match. 
 
Biometric Errors 
Access control requires high accuracy. Unfortunately, there are many questions about the reliability of various types 
of biometric authentication. One issue [3] is error rate, which refers to accuracy when the supplicant is not trying to 
deceive the system. The other accuracy issue is the deception rate, which is the likelihood that an impostor will be 
able to deceive the system if he or she tries. For now, we will focus on error rates. 
 
FALSE ACCEPTANCE RATE  
An acceptance means that the person is matched to a particular template. As we have just seen, a false acceptance is 
a match to a template that should not be made. The rate of false acceptances as a percentage of total access attempts 
is called the false acceptance rate (FAR). 
 
False acceptances have different implications for different uses, for instance, in door or computer access versus 
terrorist watch lists. 
 
For access to a computer or a door, a false acceptance means an impostor is matched with a legitimate template and 
thereby given access. As a consequence, an impostor can get in (even without attempting deception). This is a serious 
security violation 
 
For terrorist watch list matching, in contrast, a false acceptance means incorrectly matching a person to the list—in 
other words, incorrectly labeling an innocent person as a terrorist. This will inconvenience the person falsely matched, 
but it is not a security breakdown. If there are too many false acceptances, however, complaints may force the system 
to be discontinued. 
 
For watch list access to an equipment room, in turn, false acceptances are security problems, while false rejections are 
merely inconvenient. 
 
FALSE REJECTION RATE  
In a false rejection, in turn, the supplicant is incorrectly rejected as a match to a template when the applicant should 
be accepted as a match. The false rejection rate (FRR), [5] then, is the probability that the system will reject a person 
who should be matched to a template. 
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•For instance, in access to a computer, a false rejection means that a legitimate user is denied access. Although not 
necessarily bad from a security viewpoint, a high FRR for computer or door access can lead to a great deal of user 
dissatisfaction, and this can kill the system. 
 
•For watch lists, false rejection means that a person who should be identified as being on a watch list is not. If this is 
a terrorist watch list, this means that a terrorist goes unidentified. This is a serious security violation. If it is a door 
access watch list for an equipment room, then it is merely an inconvenience. 
 
WHICH IS WORSE? 
Which is worse, then—a false acceptance or a false rejection? It depends on the context. In door or server access, a 
false acceptance allows an attacker in and is a serious violation. A false rejection is simply an inconvenience. For 
terrorist watch list matching, however, a false rejection (a failure to match an attacker to a watch list template) is a 
major security violation. A false acceptance, in turn, is only a nuisance. 
 
VENDOR CLAIMS 
Unfortunately, vendor claims for FARs and FRRs can be misleading. They usually are based on idealized situations 
that are not representative of real-world conditions. For instance, we have seen that the false acceptance rate increases 
as the number of templates increases because there is a small false acceptance probability for each template. To take 
advantage of this, vendors may base FAR estimates on databases with only a few templates. In addition, vendors enroll 
users under ideal circumstances and have ideal situations for the access attempt. For instance, in face recognition, their 
test subjects might be very well lit and looking straight forward for both enrollment and access attempts conditions 
that are not likely to occur in the real world. This can make a vendor’s reported false rejection rate lower than it would 
be in practice. 
 
FAILURE TO ENROLL  
There is another type of error, failure to enroll (FTE).This occurs if the system will not enroll a user. For instance, in 
the case of fingerprint authentication, some people do not have well-defined fingerprints due to age, years of 
construction labor, long clerical paper handling, or other reasons. In some cases, this can make a fingerprint 
authentication system useless. 
 
VERIFICATION, IDENTIFICATION, AND WATCH LISTS 
1. VERIFICATION 
Biometric authentication [1] has one of three possible goals. In verification, a supplicant claims to be a particular 
person, and the challenge is to measure the supplicant’s biometric access data against the template of the person he or 
she claims to be. When you log into a server with a username and password, this is verification.  
 
Every time a match is attempted, there is a danger of a false match, meaning that the template data may match the 
applicant’s access data when there should not be a match. 
 
This danger usually is small, and because verification only matches the access data to a single template, there is only 
one chance of a false match. 
 
To give an example, if the probability of a false acceptance is one in a thousand, then probability of a false acceptance 
is one in a thousand because only one match is attempted. There is a false acceptance rate (FAR) of 0.1 percent. 
 
 
Fig. 4: Verification process 
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2. IDENTIFICATION 
In identification, in contrast, the supplicant does not claim to be a particular person. It is [5] the job of the system to 
identify the supplicant, that is, to determine who he or she is. 
 
In identification, the supplicant’s biometric access data must be matched against the templates of everyone whose 
template is stored in the system. If the system finds no matches, it rejects the supplicant. In identification, the system 
makes many matches between the applicant’s access data and the templates in the system. With each match, there is 
a small danger of a false match (false acceptance). Given the many matches required in identification compared with 
the single match required in verification, the chance of a false match is much higher in identification than it is in 
verification. 
 
For example, suppose that the probability of a false match per template is 1/1,000. Suppose also that there are 500 
templates in the database. Then there will be 500 match attempts, and the FAR will be 1/1,000 times 500, or 50 
percent. This is 500 times the false acceptance rate for verification. 
 
On the positive side, identification frees users from the need to type their names or account names. Identification is 
best for door access control and other situations in which identity claims cannot be made by the supplicant. 
 
Fig. 5: Identification Process 
 
3. WATCH LISTS 
A limited but increasingly important form of identification is the watch list, which identifies a person as being a 
member of a group. For instance, the matches may be made against the templates of people on a terrorist watch list. 
Or, matches may be made against the members of a repair team who should be allowed to enter a room. Watch list 
matching makes more access data–template comparisons than verification and so is more prone to false acceptances. 
However, watch list matching makes fewer comparisons than full identification and so is less susceptible to false 
acceptances. 
 
Biometric Deception 
Although errors are a serious concern, deception is even more troublesome. A biometric system [5] with low error 
rates is useless if it can be deceived effectively with reasonable effort. 
 
In deception, an attacker deliberately attempts to fool the system. For instance, many fingerprint scanners can be 
fooled if the adversary lifts a latent (present but not visible) fingerprint from a glass, puts it on a gelatin finger, and 
places the fake finger on the fingerprint scanner. 
 
In watch list matching with a surveillance camera system at an airport, an attacker may walk into an airport and keep 
his or her head down and wear a brimmed hat to–deceive the matching algorithm. Real-world biometric deception 
rates are largely unknown, except for fingerprint scanners, for which deception frequently works using unsophisticated 
methods. Fortunately, for many assets, deception is not a critical issue. For instance, an ordinary person without 
sensitive information on a notebook computer is not likely to face a sophisticated attacker. In the case of notebooks 
without sensitive information, fingerprint readers mainly exist to eliminate passwords, which are too weak and are too 
frequently written down by users. 
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BIOMETRIC METHODS 
1. FINGERPRINT RECOGNITION 
Thanks to crime movies, almost everyone is familiar with fingerprint recognition. Fingerprint recognition technology 
is well developed and inexpensive. Fingerprint [2] scanners are cheap enough to be added to computers and even small 
handheld devices. Due to their low cost, fingerprint scanners account for most of the total biometrics market. 
Unfortunately, fingerprint recognition technology often is easy to deceive. In 2002, researchers were able to defeat 80 
percent of fingerprint recognition systems by creating a gelatin finger from a  latent print (i.e., an invisible print left 
on a glass or other object).12 Fingerprint readers that can better detect deception use measures such as measuring skin 
capacitance and even pulse rates. However, these types of fingerprint readers are expensive and so are less widely 
used. Given that fingerprint scanners can be deceived, we have noted that they should only be used in applications for 
which there is little danger of serious deception. An example would be logging into a personal computer that does not 
hold sensitive information. 
 
 
Fig. 6: Fingerprint recognition 
 
2. IRIS RECOGNITION 
The iris is the colored part of your eye. Irises are far more complex and individual than fingerprints. In fact, iris 
recognition is the most precise form of biometric authentication, with very low FARs. In general, iris scanning [4] is 
the gold standard in biometric authentication today. Unfortunately, like gold, it is expensive. Iris scanners can read 
iris patterns from several centimeters to a meter or so away. In movies, iris scanning typically is shown as a red laser 
beam shining into the supplicant’s eye. This is complete nonsense. With iris scanners, people simply look into ordinary 
cameras. There is typically a small TV monitor to help the supplicant ensure that he or she is looking directly into the 
camera. 
 
Fig. 7: Iris recognition 
 
3. FACE RECOGNITION 
Facial features can be read from several meters away. This makes face recognition useful for door access control. 
However, face recognition [2] is highly sensitive to lighting differences between the scanned image stored on the 
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computer and the situation in which the scan is taken. It also is moderately sensitive to changes in facial features such 
as facial hair, and it is often very sensitive to deception by people turning their faces away from the camera. The only 
major benefit of face recognition [4] is that it can be used surreptitiously, that is, without the subject’s knowledge. 
This makes it seem to be good for surveillance cameras [11] searching for criminals and terrorists. However, its high 
error rates and the ease with which it can be deceived make its use for criminal and terrorist watch lists highly suspect. 
 
 
Fig. 8: Face recognition 
 
4. HAND GEOMETRY 
Human hand geometry, [4] including finger length, finger width, palm width, and other characteristics, is fairly easy 
to measure and is used mostly in door access control because of the size of hand geometry scanners. The user simply 
places his or her hand on a scanner that is the size of a textbook. 
 
 
Fig. 9: Hand geometry 
 
5. VOICE RECOGNITION 
Fingerprint, iris, face, hand geometry, and vein recognition are examples of something you are. Voice recognition, in 
contrast, is based on something you do, namely speak. 
 
Unfortunately, voice recognition is easily deceived by recordings. In addition, high false rejection rates make voice 
recognition frustrating to users. 
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Fig. 10: Voice recognition 
 
OTHER FORMS OF BIOMETRIC AUTHENTICATION 
There are many other forms of biometric authentication the recognition of veins in the hand, keystroke recognition 
(typing pace between levels), written signature recognition, and the recognition of gait (way of walking), to name just 
a few. However, fingerprint, iris, face, and hand geometry are the most widely used types of biometric authentication 
today, and fingerprint recognition is dominant. 
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